This document describes TLS server identity verification procedure for SMTP Submission, IMAP, POP and ManageSieve clients.
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December 2015 email use, and would enable email client developers to write more secure code.
Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] .
The following terms or concepts are used through the document:
reference identifier: (formally defined in [RFC6125] ) One of the domain names that the email client (an SMTP, IMAP, POP3 or ManageSieve client) associates with the target email server. For some identifier types, the identifier also includes an application service type. Reference identifiers are used for performing name checks on server certificates.
CN-ID, DNS-ID, SRV-ID and URI-ID are identifier types (see [RFC6125] for details). For convenience, their short definitions from [RFC6125] are listed below:
CN-ID = a Relative Distinguished Name (RDN) in the certificate subject field that contains one and only one attribute-type-andvalue pair of type Common Name (CN), where the value matches the overall form of a domain name (informally, dot-separated letterdigit-hyphen labels).
DNS-ID = a subjectAltName entry of type dNSName SRV-ID = a subjectAltName entry of type otherName whose name form is SRVName URI-ID = a subjectAltName entry of type uniformResourceIdentifier whose value includes both (i) a "scheme" and (ii) a "host" component (or its equivalent) that matches the "reg-name" rule (where the quoted terms represent the associated [RFC5234] productions from [RFC3986] ).
Email Server Certificate Verification Rules
During a TLS negotiation, an email client (i.e., an SMTP, IMAP, POP3 or ManageSieve client) MUST check its understanding of the server identity (client's reference identifiers) against the server's identity as presented in the server Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. This check is only performed after the server certificate passes certification path validation as described in Section 6 of [RFC5280] . Matching is performed according 2. When using email service discovery procedure specified in [RFC6186] the client MUST also use the domain portion of the user's email address as another "reference identifier" to compare against SRV-ID identifier in the server certificate.
The rules and guidelines defined in [RFC6125] apply to an email server certificate, with the following supplemental rules:
1. Support for the DNS-ID identifier type (subjectAltName of dNSName type [RFC5280] ) is REQUIRED in Email client software implementations.
2. Support for the SRV-ID identifier type (subjectAltName of SRVName type [RFC4985] ) is REQUIRED for email client software implementations that support [RFC6186] . List of SRV-ID types for email services is specified in [RFC6186] . For the ManageSieve protocol the service name "sieve" is used.
3. URI-ID identifier type (subjectAltName of uniformResourceIdentifier type [RFC5280] ) MUST NOT be used by clients for server verification, as URI-ID were not historically used for email.
4. For backward compatibility with deployed software CN-ID identifier type (CN attribute from the subject name, see [RFC6125] ) MAY be used for server identity verification. 3. For backward compatibility with deployed client base, CA MUST support issuance of server certificates with CN-ID identifier type (CN attribute from the subject name, see [RFC6125] ).
4. CA MAY allow "*" (wildcard) as the left-most name component of DNS-ID or CN-ID in server certificates it issues.
Notes on handling of delegated email services by Certification Authorities
[RFC6186] provides an easy way for organizations to autoconfigure email clients. It also allows for delegation of email services to an email hosting provider. When connecting to such delegated hosting service an email client that attempts to verify TLS server identity needs to know that if it connects to imap.hosting.example.net that such server is authorized to provide email access for an email such as alice@example.org. In absence of SRV-IDs, users of compliant email clients would be forced to manually confirm exception, because the TLS server certificate verification procedures specified in this document would result in failure to match the TLS server certificate against the expected domain(s The ability to issue certificates that contain an SRV-ID (or a DNS-ID for the domain part of email addresses) implies the ability to verify that entities requesting them are authorized to run email service for these SRV-IDs/DNS-IDs. In particular, certification authorities that can't verify such authorization (whether for a particular domain or in general) MUST NOT include such email SRV-IDs/DNS-IDs in certificates they issue. This document doesn't specify exact mechanism(s) that can be used to achieve this. However, a few special case recommendations are listed below.
A certification authority willing to sign a certificate containing a particular DNS-ID SHOULD also support signing a certificate containing one or more of email SRV-IDs for the same domain, because the SRV-ID effectively provides more restricted access to an email service for the domain (as opposed to unrestricted use of any services for the same domain, as specified by DNS-ID).
A certification authority which also provides DNS service for a domain can use DNS information to validate SRV-IDs/DNS-IDs for the domain.
A certification authority which is also a Mail Service Provider for a hosted domain can use that knowdledge to validate SRV-IDs/DNS-IDs for the domain. 
Examples
Consider an IMAP-accessible email server which supports both IMAP and IMAPS (IMAP-over-TLS) at the host "mail.example.net" servicing email addresses of the form "user@example.net". A certificate for this service needs to include DNS-IDs of "example.net" (because it is the domain portion of emails) and "mail.example.net" (this is what a user of this server enters manually, if not using [RFC6186] ). It might also include CN-ID of "mail.example.net" for backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure.
Consider the IMAP-accessible email server from the previous paragraph which is additionally discoverable via DNS SRV lookups in domain "example.net" (DNS SRV records "_imap._tcp.example.net" and "_imaps._tcp.example.net"). In addition to DNS-ID/CN-ID identity types specified above, a certificate for this service also needs to include SRV-IDs of "_imap.example.net" (when STARTTLS is used on the IMAP port) and "_imaps.example.net" (when TLS is used on IMAPS port). See [RFC6186] for more details. (Note that unlike DNS SRV there is no "_tcp" component in SRV-IDs).
Consider the IMAP-accessible email server from the first paragraph which is running on a host also known as "mycompany.example.com". In addition to DNS-ID identity types specified above, a certificate for this service also needs to include DNS-ID of "mycompany.example.com" (this is what a user of this server enters manually, if not using [RFC6186] ). It might also include CN-ID of "mycompany.example.com" instead of the CN-ID "mail.example.net" for backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure. (This is so, because a certificate can only include a single CN-ID)
Consider an SMTP Submission server at the host "submit.example.net" servicing email addresses of the form "user@example.net" and discoverable via DNS SRV lookups in domain "example.net" (DNS SRV records "_submission._tcp.example.net"). A certificate for this service needs to include SRV-IDs of "_submission.example.net" (see [RFC6186] ) along with DNS-IDs of "example.net" and "submit.example.net". It might also include CN-ID of "submit.example.net" for backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure.
Consider a host "mail.example.net" servicing email addresses of the form "user@example.net" and discoverable via DNS SRV lookups in domain "example.net", which runs SMTP Submission, IMAPS and POP3S (POP3-over-TLS) and ManageSieve services. Each of the servers can use their own certificate specific to their service (see examples above). Alternatively they can all share a single certificate that would include SRV-IDs of "_submission.example.net", "_imaps.example.net", "_pop3s.example.net" and "_sieve.example.net" along with DNS-IDs of "example.net" and "mail.example.net". It might also include CN-ID of "mail.example.net" for backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure.
Operational Considerations
Section 5 covers operational considerations (in particular use of DNS SRV for autoconfiguration) related to generating TLS certificiates for email servers so that they can be successfully verified by email clients. Additionally, Section 5.1 talks about operational considerations related to hosting multiple domains.
IANA Considerations
This document doesn't require any action from IANA.
Security Considerations
The goal of this document is to improve interoperability and thus security of email clients wishing to access email servers over TLS protected email protocols, by specifying a consistent set of rules that email service providers, email client writers and Certification Authorities can use when creating server certificates.
TLS Server Identity Check for Email relies on use of trustworthy DNS hostnames when constructing "reference identifiers" that are checked against an email server certificate. Such trustworthy names are either entered manually (for example if they are advertised on a Mail Service Provider's website), explicitly confirmed by the user (e.g. if they are a target of a DNS SRV lookup) or derived using a secure third party service (e.g. DNSSEC-protected SRV records which are verified by the client or trusted local resolver). Future work in this area might benefit from integration with DANE [RFC6698] , but it is not covered by this document. During the TLS negotiation, the client checks its understanding of the server identity against the provided server's identity as specified in Section 3.
The 3rd paragraph (and its subparagraphs) in Section 11.1 of RFC 3501 is replaced with the following text:
During the TLS negotiation, the IMAP client checks its understanding of the server identity against the provided server's identity as specified in Section 3.
The 3rd paragraph (and its subparagraphs) in Section 4.1 of RFC 3207 is replaced with the following text:
During the TLS negotiation, the Submission client checks its understanding of the server identity against the provided server's identity as specified in Section 3.
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.1.1 of RFC 5804 are replaced with the following text:
During the TLS negotiation, the ManageSieve client checks its understanding of the server identity against the server's identity as specified in Section 3. When the reference identity is an IP address, the iPAddress subjectAltName SHOULD be used by the client for comparison. The comparison is performed as described in Section 2.2.1.2 of RFC 5804. 
